United States Supreme Court Permits Mandatory Arbitration Of Federal Age Claims In The Union Context

April 1, 2009

Summary

Today, in a significant shift from prior precedent, the United States Supreme Court held that a collective bargaining agreement provision that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate federal age discrimination claims is enforceable under federal law.  While the Court was careful to avoid an outright reversal of its prior decisions, the holding demonstrates the Court's shift over the last twenty (20) years toward favoring the arbitration of federal law-based claims.

Discussion

The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) at issue in Penn Plaza v. Pyett was negotiated between a union representing building service employees and a multi-employer bargaining association for the New York City real estate industry.  The CBA contained an arbitration provision that required union employees to submit discrimination claims under a number of federal and state anti-discrimination statutes to binding arbitration.  One of the laws expressly mentioned was the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 

After the employer reorganized its workforce, the union filed a grievance on behalf of security guards who were reassigned to work as night porters and light duty cleaners.  The union's grievance referred to a number of contract-based claims, and included an age discrimination allegation.  The union pursued the contract claims in a grievance arbitration.  While the arbitration was on-going, the individual employees pursued their age-based claims in federal court, under the ADEA.

In an attempt to enforce the CBA's mandatory arbitration provision, the employer filed a motion in federal District Court, asking the Court to compel arbitration of the employees' age-based claims.  Both the District Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the employer's motion, holding that, under Supreme Court precedent, a union could not collectively waive individual employees' statutory rights.

The Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit, finding that a union was not precluded from collectively agreeing to arbitration of any rights under the ADEA.  Justice Thomas, who authored the majority opinion, took care to attempt to square this new position with the Court's prior precedent.  He reasoned that the ADEA itself does not preclude arbitration of claims, and a labor union is empowered to act as a collective representative for individual employees.  Since the arbitration provision was a freely-negotiated term of the CBA, and the arbitration provision expressly referred to the ADEA statute by name, the provision constituted a clear and unmistakable waiver of employees' rights to seek relief from a court.

Justice Thomas also corrected what he termed a "key analytical mistake" in the Court's earlier decisions.  He noted that a voluntary decision to collectively bargain for arbitration does not waive an employee's statutory right to be free from workplace age discrimination.  It simply waives an employee's right to seek relief from a court.  Justice Thomas also highlighted the Supreme Court's shift toward favoring the arbitration process by noting the "radical change, over two decades, in the Court's receptivity to arbitration."

What This Means

Union employers who are covered by the National Labor Relations Act should review any arbitration provision contained in their CBAs to determine whether it expressly refers to the ADEA by name.  If its does, the employer will likely be able to mandate arbitration of individual ADEA claims.  The Supreme Court's holding also leaves open the possibility that employers may be able to require arbitration of other federal anti-discrimination claims, such as those under Title VII.

It is unclear, however, what impact this decision will have under California law.  The California Supreme Court has held that in order to have a valid arbitration agreement in the employment context, there must be a mechanism that allows the full and fair adjudication of the claim.  Unless the arbitration mechanism under a CBA does so, it is unclear whether a California court would enforce the arbitration provision and/or follow the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Penn Plaza v. Pyett.

This case also benefits non-union employers who presently use, or who wish to use, arbitration to resolve federal law employment-related disputes.  In its decision, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that arbitration was a forum well-suited to resolve federal employment claims such as those under Title VII and the ADEA. 

Finally, it's possible that the Supreme Court's decision will spur Congress to either amend the ADEA to prohibit arbitration of claims, or to otherwise ban the arbitration of all employment-related disputes.  Indeed, such a bill, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, was introduced in the House of Representatives on February 12, 2009.  While the fate of the Arbitration Fairness Act bill has yet to be determined, this area of law may rapidly evolve.

This e-update was authored by Brenda Kasper and Michael Sullivan.  For more information, or questions, please contact Ms. Kasper, Mr. Sullivan or any Paul, Plevin attorney at (619) 237-5200.


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